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This sixth survey covers the legislative changes to our Workmen's
Compensation Act1 adopted by the 1965 session of the Florida Legisla-
ture and all reported judicial decisions since publication of the last
survey.2
Little change was effectuated by the 1965 legislature, the most sig-
nificant changes being in the field of apportionment and permanent
disability benefits for body type injuries. One hundred and ten judicial
opinions were handed down by the Florida Supreme Court and the district
courts of appeal during the period surveyed. Of significance is the added
fact that the Florida Supreme Court has adopted a new procedure of
dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule
3.10(e) and has denied certiorari without opinion in an additional one
hundred and fourteen cases.3 The subject matter covered by this survey
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1965).
2. The last survey covered the 1963 session of the Florida Legislature and judicial
decisions reported from Volume 131 SOUTHERN REPORTER 2nd Series to and including Volume
150 SOUTHERN REPORTER 2nd Series. This survey covers those reported decisions beginning
with Volume 151 SOUTHERN REPORTER 2nd Series up to and including Volume 175 SOUTHERN
REPORTER 2nd Series. For prior survey articles, see Burton, Florida Workmen's Compensa-
tion--1935 to 1950, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 74 (1950); Clements, Workmen's Compensation, 8 MIAMI
L.Q. 469 (1954); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation-1954-1959, 14 U. MLAmI L. REv. 154
(1959); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 216 (1961); Schroll,
Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 398 (1963).
3. The one hundred and fourteen cases were identifiable by the brief statement set forth
by the court dispensing with oral argument and denying certiorari. Of the one hundred and
fourteen petitions for writ of certiorari, twenty-six were taken by the employer-carrier,
eighty-four were taken by the claimant with the remaining four being taken by both
claimant and the employer-carrier.
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will again be presented by topics rather than by a chronologically order-
ing of the cases.
I. SPECIAL DISABILITY FUND
The Special Disability Fund4 as amended by the 1963 legislature
suffered no additional changes by the 1965 session of the Florida Legis-
lature. Little judicial activity has taken place concerning the still un-
settled purposes and effect of the Special Disability Fund and there have
been no judicial decisions interpreting the effect, if any, of the 1963
legislative changes.5
The fact that the Special Disability Fund does bestow additional
benefits upon injured workmen suffering with pre-existing handicaps was
again demonstrated in the case of Dorsey v. L. & A. Contracting Co.6
In Dorsey, the claimant suffered a compensable injury to the thumb and
forefinger of his right hand. As a result of pre-existing ulnar nerve palsy
the remaining three fingers of claimant's right hand resembled a claw
which admittedly constituted a pre-existing permanent physical impair-
ment. The deputy commissioner found the claimant to have an overall
sixty percent loss of use of the right hand of which twenty-five percent
was attributable to the pre-existing disability resulting from the nerve
palsy and thirty-five percent due to the injury. The deputy awarded com-
pensation only for the thirty-five percent loss of use. In remanding the
cause, the supreme court directed the deputy to make only one addi-
tional finding of fact, to-wit: the employer's notice of the pre-existing
permanent physical impairment. The court stated that if the deputy
would find that the employer had notice of the then pre-existing condi-
tion he must award, under the provisions of the Special Disability Fund,
the full sixty percent loss of use of the hand. If the employer had no
notice then the claimant would be limited to recover the thirty-five
percent loss of use of the hand resulting from the effects of the accident
alone. The court stated:
We recognize that the requirement of knowledge by the em-
ployer of the worker's physical impairment will in some instances
deny an injured claimant benefits for the combined effect of a
prior and later injury when the employer does not have or can-
not be charged with such knowledge.7
In the more recent decision of Logan v. Maintenance, Inc.,' an
4. FLA. STAT. § 440.49(4) (1963).
5. Justice Drew's dissenting opinion in the case of Hallett v. Westover Arms, 168 So.2d
544 (Fla. 1964), tends to indicate that judicial interpretation of the 1963 Special Disability
Fund amendment will result in a change in the substantive benefit which the Fund has
bestowed upon injured workmen suffering from pre-existing impairments or handicaps.
6. 155 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1963).
7. Supra note 6, at 359.
8. 173 So.2d 690 (Fla. 1965).
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injured workman, who had previously undergone spinal surgery and
fusion, sustained a new injury to his back as a result of a compensable
accident. The employer had hired the claimant with full knowledge of
his prior back operation and condition. As a result of the new injuries
being superimposed upon the old injury, the claimant was adjudged by
the deputy commissioner to be permanently and totally disabled under
the provisions of the Special Disability Fund. On review, the full com-
mission reversed the deputy and remanded the cause with directions to
enter a new award under the apportionment sections.' The supreme court
granted certiorari and quashed the order of the commission with direc-
tions that the deputy's award be reinstated. The court rejected the re-
spondent's argument that the later injury merely added to what previously
existed.
II. APPORTIONMENT
10
In Shores Dev., Inc. v. Carver," the claimant had stepped off a
three foot scaffold landing with all his weight on his right foot. At the
time of the incident, claimant was suffering from a progressive bone
disease known as asceptic or avascular necrosis of the head of the right
femur. X-rays taken two days later showed fracture lines in the diseased
femur. The uncontradicted medical evidence demonstrated that an acci-
dent such as the one related by the claimant probably did accelerate to
some degree the progress of the disease. The deputy found that the
claimant had sustained a compensable injury which aggravated the pre-
existing disease and awarded temporary total disability benefits and
medical care. Upon review it was contended by the employer and carrier
that among the errors of the deputy was his failure to apportion under
section 440.02(19) of the 1963 Florida Statutes. The supreme court
agreed with the employer and carrier and remanded the cause to the
deputy commissioner for apportionment of the temporary disability
benefits as well as the medical care which claimant required. 2
The difficulty encountered in attempting to separate and obtain
treatment only for that portion of the injury attributable to the aggrava-
tion or acceleration was subsequently recognized in 1965. The legislature
amended section 440.02(19), so as to m4ke anomalies, as well as pre-
existing diseases, subject to the apportionment doctrine, but expressly
limited the doctrine to permanent disability or death benefits. Compen-
sation for temporary disability and medical benefits is no longer subject to
apportionment under that subsection.
During the two years surveyed, the doctrine of apportionment has
9. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1961).
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1963).
11. 164 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1964).
12. Accord, Board of County Comm'rs v. Roberts, 172 So.2d 235 (Fla. 1965).
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been applied to aggravation of pre-existing dermatitis conditions, 3 acci-
dents initiating heart attacks,'14 pre-existing back injuries, and to prior
back injuries with the same employer, the responsibility for which had
been terminated by a joint petition for lump sum settlement, more com-
monly known as a "Wash-Out."'" In permanent total disability cases
subject to apportionment, the Florida Supreme Court again held that the
doctrine shall apply to the weekly compensation rate rather than to the
length of disability payments. 7
In Won v. Won's Chinese Restaurant,"8 the deputy commissioner
found that the claimant had suffered from a pre-existing intervertebral
disc disease which was aggravated by a subsequent compensable indus-
trial accident. It was further found that the claimant suffered a five per-
cent permanent disability because of the aggravation and further, that
the claimant had a thirty percent loss of wage earning capacity. Com-
pensation for such injuries were accordingly awarded to her. On review,
the commission reversed the award and remanded to the deputy for ap-
portionment. Certiorari was granted by the Florida Supreme Court, the
court stating:
These findings, as to the claim of a want of apportionment, do
not show a want of apportionment or that the deputy failed to
apportion in making the award. The findings of the deputy do
not appear to be insufficient.' 9
In the Won case, the court was apparently satisfied with the deputy's
adjudication as to the degree of aggravation and did not require a deter-
mination of the overall disability which would then fall subject to
apportionment.
III. HEART CASES
The Victor Wine rule, applicable to heart cases,20 has undergone
clarification, and its usage limited only to those cases where the heart
attack was the primary injury upon which the workmen's compensation
claim was filed. Where the heart injury was not the primary injury, but
is a subsequent injury related in some way to the original compensable
primary injury, the Victor Wine rule no longer applies. Rather, our
13. Hodges v. State Rd. Dep't, 171 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1965).
14. Scott v. Kerr, 156 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1963).
15. Overholser Constr. Co. v. Porter, 173 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1964).
16. Hallett v. Westover Arms, 168 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1964).
17. Mercury Cab v. Eibister, 168 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1964).
18. 174 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1965).
19. Supra note 18, at 21.
20. Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1961) wherein the court
announced the following rule for heart cases:
When disabling heart attacks are involved and where such heart conditions are
precipitated by work connected exertion affecting a pre-existing non-disabling heart
disease, injuries are compensable only if the employee was at the time subject to
unusual strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work he was accustomed
to performing.
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court has adopted the common law concept of "direct and natural re-
sults" in determining compensability of secondary or subsequent heart
injury cases.
This new rule was first announced in Sosenko v. American Air Mo-
tive Corp.2 The claimant, a thirty-eight year old male with an eleventh
grade education, was involved in an admittedly compensable accident
which resulted in a fracture of the right oscalcis. The accident resulted in
considerable pain and temporary disability. Because of the pain the
claimant lost sleep and was required to take sleeping pills. He became
depressed and upset and feared that he would never be able to return to
his old occupation as it required much climbing and walking. Approxi-
mately three months after his accident, claimant, after engaging in a
normal day's activities and a casual evening with friends, experienced
chest pain and was admitted to a hospital. His condition was diagnosed
as an acute myocardial ischemia and posterior wall infarct. The carrier
continued to pay claimant on a temporary total disability basis for his
ankle injury, but denied responsibility for the heart attack. In quashing
the order of the commission, and in remanding the cause to the deputy,
the supreme court held that the Victor Wine rule was not applicable to
this type of case. The court adopted the following rule as applicable:
The basic rule is that a subsequent injury, whether an aggrava-
tion of the original injury, is compensable if it is the direct and
natural result of a compensable primary injury. But if the sub-
sequent injury is attributable to claimant's own negligence or
fault, the chain of causation is broken, even if the primary
injury may have contributed in part to the occurrence of the
subsequent injury.22
Thus the Sosenko case was remanded to the deputy in order to deter-
mine if claimant's heart attack was the "direct and natural, result" of
the compensable primary injury. Of similar import was the subsequent
decisions by the supreme court in the cases of Scott v. Kerr,2" and Tingle
v. Board of County Comm'rs.u4 In both of these cases, the claimants sus-
tained an accident within the definition of the Workmen's Compensation
Act " and subsequently incurred heart attack. The Victor Wine rule was
held not to be applicable, the court stating in the Scott case:
The record having established the occurrence of an industrial
accident, the question remains regarding the causal relation-
ship between the accident and the ensuing heart attack. 8
The court went on to discuss the medical testimony regarding causal
21. 156 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1963).
22. Id. at 492. Disability produced by medical care furnished for compensable injury
also compensable. Martini v. Kapok Tree Inn, 172 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1964).
23. 156 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1963).
24. 174 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1965).
25. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1963).
26. Supra note 23 at 849.
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relationship and remanded both cases to the deputy commissioner for
application of the doctrine of apportionment. 27
Additional guidelines in determining whether a particular activity
which results in a heart attack is non-routine were set forth by the
supreme court in Yates v. Gabrio Elec. Co.28 In that case, the claimant
devoted approximately ninety percent of his time to relatively light
work as an electrician's helper. The remaining ten percent was devoted
intermittently to what could be described as heavy work, such as bending
conduits and operating a ditch digger. While engaged in the heavier work
and while lifting concrete blocks, claimant sustained a fatal heart attack.
Medical testimony related the attack to the lifting of the concrete blocks.
In quashing the order of the commission, and in reinstating the award of
compensation benefits by the deputy, the court stated:
We agree with Respondent that in ascertaining whether a partic-
ular activity is non-routine, we must look to the duty per-
formed by the employee himself, rather than by his fellow
workers. Similarly, we should examine the work done by the
employee as an entirety, rather than some isolated segment of
his activities. However, when, as here, the deputy is presented
with evidence that a specific activity was non-routine and an
examination of the employee's work history likewise sustained
such a conclusion, the findings of the deputy regarding the
non-routine nature of the specific activity should not be dis-
turbed. The deputy's order in the instant case was well within
the Victor Wine rule.
29
The opinion of the court in the Yates case was not unanimous.
Justice Caldwell dissented, arguing that the court had created an illusory
exception which will vitiate the rule laid down in the Victor Wine case.
IV. DISABILITY BENEFITS
Non-disabling extended effects of scheduled injuries have been
held not to remove the disability award from the operation of the
scheduled benefits prescribed by the legislature.80 In Little River Bank
& Trust Co. v. Neal,"' the claimant sustained an injury to his thumb
with resulting pain extending into his hand. An award of disability bene-
fits for a hand disability was reversed in that there was no showing that
the pain extending into the hand was of a disabling type nor was it shown
that the thumb injury interfered with the use of the remainder of the
hand. Claimant's disability benefits, therefore, were limited to a thumb
27. For a factual case apportioning disability see Wilkes v. Oscars Transfer & Storage,
164 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1964).
28. 167 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1964).
29. Supra note 28, at 567.
30. FLA STAT. § 440.15(3) (1963).
31. 154 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1963).
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disability. Conversely, in Mobley v. Jack & Son Plumbing,82 the claimant
sustained an elbow injury, the extended effects of which were found by
the deputy to cause shoulder complaints. The deputy commissioner
removed the disability award from the confines of the scheduled elbow
injury and awarded disability benefits based on wage earning capacity
loss due to the extended effects of the injury into the body. The award
was affirmed.
The deputy's formula in arriving at the percentage of disability due
to wage earning capacity loss in the case of Pryor v. Sun Coast Medical
Clinic,33 was reversed by the commission but subsequently reinstated by
the Florida Supreme Court. In that case, the claimant was shown to
have a disc injury to his spine which the medical experts evaluated to
be equal to a fifteen percent functional disability. The deputy commis-
sioner compared the claimant's average weekly wage of approximately
one hundred and fourteen dollars to his post injury earnings of forty to
fifty dollars per week and awarded a sixty percent permanent partial
disability based on wage earning capacity loss.
In an earlier decision, Board of County Comm'rs v. Alman, 4 the
court held that the average weekly wage at the time of the accident was
equivalent to the wage earning capacity at the time of accident. The
court affirmed a denial of permanent disability benefits wherein the post
injury earnings were greater than the average weekly wage. The fact
that claimants may earn the same or greater wages after an accident
was held not to be controlling and would not prevent an award of per-
manent partial disability where other evidence showed an inability to
compete in the open labor market. 5
The celebrated case of Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bell,86
reached its terminal stage in 1964. The claimant had a twenty percent
medical or functional impairment of the body as a whole. He had re-
turned to work for the employer and had obtained a better job at higher
pay. In reviewing the disabled employee's physical abilities, age and
education as well as present employment status, the deputy found the
claimant to have a twenty-one percent permanent partial disability, this
finding being bottomed on the additional finding that the employment
furnished the disabled workman by the employer was "sheltered." On
review, it was determined that the finding that the workman was engaged
in sheltered employment was not supported by competent substantial
32. 170 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1964).
33. 165 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964).
34. 156 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1963). Accord, Principe v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 156 So.2d 385
(Fla. 1963).
35. Hughes v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 155 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1962). Ciand v. State
Beverage Dep't, 157 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1963), salary increase also held not to be conclusive.
36. 167 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1964). See Bell v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 152 So.2d 473
(Fla. 1963), wherein court likened assessment of wage earning capacity loss to a prediction
about the indefinite future.
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evidence. The court ordered the claim to be denied. Subsequently in the
case of Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hayes,87 a finding of forty percent
wage earning capacity loss was reversed where the evidence only sup-
ported a functional or medical disability of thirty-five percent. The court
again distinguished a loss of wage earning capacity as opposed to a mere
functional loss or loss of wages. As a result of legislative changes made by
the 1965 legislative session, the Bell and Montgomery Ward cases are, for
the most part, of historical value only. The wage earning capacity loss
section of the Workmen's Compensation Act was amended in 1965, by
addition of the following provisions:
[P]rovided, however, that for the purpose of this para-
graph "disability" means either physical impairment or diminu-
tion of wage earning capacity, whichever is greater.88
As a result of the amendment, employers and their carriers are obligated
to pay the "functional" or "medical" disability as distinguished from
"wage earning capacity" where there is no showing that the wage earning
capacity loss is greater.
A showing of greater wage earning capacity loss over and above the
physical impairment was demonstrated in Richardson v. City of Tampa."9
The claimant was a fifty-one year old illiterate with an intelligence
quotient of sixty. As a result of a compensable accident, claimant sus-
tained a herniated disc for which he refused surgery. The physicians
evaluated the physical impairment at forty percent of the body as a
whole. The deputy commissioner awarded sixty-five percent permanent
partial disability. On review, the supreme court held that there was
competent substantial evidence to support the sixty-five percent award,
the court going on to state:
But we are convinced that there was ample evidence to
justify, indeed to require, that the deputy proceed beyond that
point to declare total permanent disability, or 100 per cent.
taking [sic] into account the tolerance the courts including this
one, recognize that a person need not be entirely out of commis-
sion to be awarded compensation for total permanent dis-
ability.4°
Similarly, the supreme court struck an unrealistic award of thirty
percent permanent partial disability in the case of Millender v. City of
Carrabelle.41 The court reviewed all of the evidence, as well as the want of
37. 172 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1965).
38. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(u) (1965).
39. 175 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1965). In this case, the court reaffirmed procedural shifting of
the burden of proof to an employer to show employability once the injured workman
demonstrates that he can handle only a specially created job.
40. Supra note 39, at 45.
41. 174 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1965).
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evidence showing that there was any kind of work available which the
injured workman could perform with any appreciable degree of regu-
larity. The court cited its prior decision regarding regularity of employ-
ment and sheltered employment.
V. MEDICAL BENEFITS
The obligation on the part of the employer, the employee, and the
medical practitioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act has had
some clarification during the period surveyed. Physicians as well as
medical institutions must file reports with the Florida Industrial Com-
mission and with the employer, the failure to do so relieving the employer
and carrier of the obligation for payment of the cost of the medical care. 2
The filing requirement may be waived by the commission48 and may also
be waived by conduct of the parties. Payment of the medical expenses
incurred constitutes waiver, at least to the extent of the payment."
The lack of a request for medical care will relieve the employer of
need to pay for medical care subsequently obtained by the workman with-
out said requests.45 However, in those instances where the employer fails
to furnish medical care, this failure does not excuse the requirement con-
cerning the filing of reports.40
Two cases concerned the question of the workman's choice of phy-
sician. In Bowman Nurseries v. King,4" an injured workman was desirous
of obtaining medical care with a particular doctor. The carrier objected
to the workman's choice of physician and offered other medical care
which was refused by the workman. The workman obtained the medical
care under the physician of his choosing. Payment of the billing was
ordered by the deputy, but the deputy was reversed upon review. It was
held that the carrier had not authorized the treatments, had offered other
medical care and was, as a consequence, not responsible for the medical
billing incurred. In the subsequent case of Black v. Blue Ribbon Laun-
dry,48 the commission reversed a deputy's order directing payment of
medical expenses incurred by a workman with a physician of his choosing.
The commission's reversal was based on the fact that the physician was
"not authorized." In reversing the commission, and in reinstating this
aspect of the deputy's order, the court noted the deputy's finding that the
injured workman had acted reasonably in seeking the aid of the physician
42. Mobley v. Jack & Son Plumbing, 170 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1964); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Southern Fla. Sanitarium & Hosp. Corp., 173 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1965).
43. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1) (1963).
44. See cases note 42 supra.
45. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hayes, 172 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1965).
46. Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., 170 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1965).
47. 155 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1963).
48. 161 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1964).
19651
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
in whom he had confidence, and that it was necessary that he have imme-
diate care and hospitalization.
As an incident to medical benefits, the Florida Industrial Commis-
sion has promulgated Rule 18 pertaining to reimbursement for traveling
expenses incurred in obtaining medical care. The Rule establishes the
reimbursement rate at seven and one-half cents per mile. In striking the
seven and one-half cent provision as legislative in nature, the supreme
court held that unless the parties in workman's compensation proceed-
ings stipulate on a mileage rate, the reasonable actual cost of traveling
expenses will have to be proven the same as any other factual issue.49
In South Coast Constr. Co. v. Chizauskas,50 a claim was made for
nursing services as a result of total blindness, it being alleged that the
claimant needed certain nursing assistance. The deputy commissioner
awarded nursing care not on a finding that nursing care was required, but
only on findings depicting that services in the nature of housekeeping
services were needed. In reversing the award, the court stated:
The findings of the Deputy quoted above are amply sup-
ported by the record. The Full Commission did not find to the
contrary. These findings clearly show that the Claimant does
not need ... remedial treatment, care and attendance under the
direction and supervision of a qualified physician or surgeon,
or other recognized practitioner, nurse or hospital .... These
are the kind of services which Section 440.13 requires an em-
ployer-carrier to furnish in an appropriate case. Housekeeping
and related services are not required to be furnished."1
Once an award has been entered requiring payment of all medical
expenses which a claimant may incur as a result of a compensable injury,
it is not necessary to subsequently demonstrate a mistake of fact or
change of condition in order to obtain further medical benefits. The
claimant need only show a need for further medical care. 2 If, as a result
of the furnishing of medical care, greater disability results, the resulting
disability is also compensable. a
VI. COVERAGE
Workmen's compensation coverage has been interpreted to extend to
the direct and natural result of compensable primary injuries"4 and to
disability resulting from medical care furnished for the primary injury.5
49. Mobley v. Jack & Son Plumbing, supra note 42.
50. 172 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1965).
51. Supra note 50, at 444.
52. Bryant v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 156 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1963).
53. Martini v. Kapok Tree Inn, 172 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1964).
54. Sosenko v. American Air Motive Corp., 156 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1963).
55. Martini v. Kapok Tree Inn, supra note 47.
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Coverage has been denied to employees whose disability or death has
resulted from horseplay of such substantial character as to amount to
abandonment of employment,56 and to an employee whose injuries were
occasioned after work, but as an incident to transportation furnished to
him as a matter of convenience, rather than as part of his employment
contract.
57
Benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act have also been ex-
tended to persons not covered by the Act, but who have been brought
under its provisions through waiver.58
In Goldstein v. Gray Decorators, Inc.,59 an injured workman was
held not to have waived benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act in
that the waiver or election not to come under the Act did not meet the
statutory requirements. The court held the claimant's intent immaterial,
unless he expressed it as required by statute.
A fact that the industrial accident occurred outside the territorial
limits of the state of Florida has not, necessarily, resulted in a denial of
coverage under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act. In Miller
Contracting Co. v. Hutto,0 the injured workman sustained injury in
Georgia and received compensation under the Georgia law. His claim for
benefits under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act was affirmed,
the court holding that Florida had jurisdiction by virtue of the contract of
employment having been made in Florida. In the earlier case of Butler v.
Allied Dairy Prod., Inc.,"1 the claimant was hired in Missouri to deliver
dairy products to Miami, Florida. The injury occurred in Missouri. How-
ever, the employer's principal place of business was in Miami and claim-
ant's wages and compensation benefits were also paid from Miami. The
deputy held the employer waived jurisdiction and awarded benefits under
the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act. On review; the full commission
reversed the deputy. In reinstating the order of the deputy, the supreme
court stated that inasmuch as the claimant was serving an industry in
56. City of Miami v. Granlund, 153 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1963). Claimant, believing a gun
was empty, aimed it at a fellow employee and then at his own head and pulled the trigger.
A bullet was left in the chamber and as a result, claimant was killed. The majority of the
court denied benefits under a split decision with an extended dissenting opinion.
57. General Dev. Corp. v. Kelley, 159 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1964), furnishing of transporta-
tion makes hazards of highway part of hazards of job, Swartzer v. Food Fair Stores, Inc.,
175 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1965). Accord, Lee v. Florida Pine & Cypress, 157 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1963),
no coverage if transportation for personal motive, Brown v. Winter Haven Citrus Growers
Ass'n, 175 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1965).
58. In Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., supra note 52, the claimant therein
was injured while cleaning his own truck used in the hauling business of the employer
association. The association had obtained workmen's compensation coverage for the claimant
who was held to be an independent contractor. However, due to the obtaining of coverage,
it was held that the exclusion was waived pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 440.04(3).
59. 166 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1964). See FLA. STAT. § 440.05(2), (3) for the statutory pro-
visions allowing an employee to elect not to come under the Act.
60. 156 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1963).
61. 151 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1963).
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this state when hurt, its conclusion that this state should shoulder the
burden does not seem to work any injustice. The court stated:
It is to us incongruous that the carrier and employer could
recognize the claim for the lengthy period we have described
and then upon demand for further benefits successfully claim at
that late date that, after all, there was no power in the Commis-
sion to act. s
Subsequently, in the case of Azarian v. Azarian,6 3 a carrier had paid
temporary total disability as well as fifteen weeks for permanent partial
disability after which claimant filed claim for further benefits. The car-
rier controverted the claim and later took the position that the claimant
was not an employee. The argument that the carrier had accepted the
claim by payment was rejected. The court held:
The mere fact that a carrier initially accepts a claim as compen-
sable has no bearing on its ultimate liability for payment should
a claim be filed for additional benefits. 4
Coverage has been afforded where the compensable origin for an
injury was found in the result rather than the suddenness of the cause. In
Zerwal v. Caribbean Modes, Inc.,"6 an injured workman suffering with a
herniated disc could not show any specific or sudden incident as the cause
of his herniated disc, but rather could show only a series of lifting inci-
dents which culminated in sharp back pain, subsequently diagnosed as a
herniated disc. In affirming its prior decisions,"6 the court stated:
As indicated in the previous opinion of this court, the doctrine
of current decisions has been clear that an internal failure
brought about by exertion in the performance of the regular em-
ployment may be found to be an injury by accident without
the necessity of showing that such injury was preceded by an
unusual external incident.6
The "last injurious exposure" doctrine,68 utilized in dermatitis cases,
Was somewhat modified in the case of Wesley's, Inc. v. Caramello.69 In
that case, the claimant suffered a contact dermatitis while in the employ
of Wesley's, Inc. He filed claim for disability as a result of this exposure
and subsequently, while in another employment, suffered a re-exposure.
Wesley's, Inc. attempted to escape responsibility for the disability result-
62. The decision of the court centered around the claimant's entitlement to compen-
sation rather than the jurisdiction of the Florida Industrial Commission.
63. 166 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1964).
64. Id. at 443.
65. 170 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1965).
66. See Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. MIAs L. REv. 504 (1963).
67. Supra note 58, at 842.
68. FLA. STAT. § 440.151(3) (1963).
69. 156 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1963).
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ing from the claimant's dermatitis while in its employment by urging that
the claimant was last exposed to conditions causing a flair-up of the
dermatitis in his subsequent employment thereby relieving Wesley's, Inc.
of further responsibility. The court rejected the argument and distin-
guished the case from those cases in which a claimant suffers exposure in
several employments with the distinguishing factor being the filing of a
claim prior to suffering subsequent exposure.
VII. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
The determination of an injured employee's average weekly wage, as
prescribed by statute, cannot be altered. In Waymire v. Florida Industrial
Comm'n,7° the workman sustained injury during a slack period of sale.
During the thirteen weeks immediately prior to this accident he earned
an average of approximately fifty-six dollars per week. Normally his earn-
ings were a hundred dollars per week. In affirming the deputy's deter-
mination of claimant's average weekly wage by utilization of the actual
earnings during the thirteen weeks prior to the accident, the supreme
court held that the deputy has no discretion unless the standards fixed by
the legislature cannot be met, regardless of "slack periods."
In determining what amount constitutes wages, the supreme court
ruled in the case of Pryor v. Sun Coast Medical Clinic,7 that an injured
workman's gross earnings of approximately one hundred and thirty-eight
dollars per week was properly reduced by twenty-five dollars per week,
this latter amount being paid by the injured workman to an assistant. The
injured workman also had two stepsons assisting him,. but the monies paid
by the injured workman to the two stepsons were held to be non-deduct-
ible from the average weekly wage due to the father-son family relation-
ship.
The average weekly wage not only determines the weekly compensa-
tion rate, but also is representative of the pre-injury earning capacity for
measuring wage earning capacity loss.72 When the parties rely on and
stipulate to an average weekly wage, this stipulation is binding on the
parties as well as the deputy commissioner who is without authority to
find an average weekly wage other than that to which the parties have
stipulated.73
VIII. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Little activity has been found in the period surveyed regarding the
statutes of limitations contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
70. 174 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1965).
71. 165 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964).
72. Principe v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 156 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1963); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Alman, 156 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1963).
73. Principe v. Mount Sinai Hosp., supra note 64; Mobly v. Jack & Son Plumbing,
170 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1964).
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What constitutes medical care sufficient to toll the running of the statute
relative to the furnishing of medical care was reviewed on two occasions.
In Gonzalez v. Allure Shoe Corp.,74 a claimant's compliance with the em-
ployer's physician's instructions to soak her arm and to take aspirins was
not considered such treatment as contemplated by the legislature to toll
the running of the statutes of limitations. In Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Tokayer,75 the furnishing of an electrocardiogram was determined to be
such remedial treatment as would toll the statute of limitations.
Carriers may not raise the statute of limitations on medical benefits
where the insured employer, through a successive carrier, in fact, fur-
nished medical benefits within the statutory time. In Iowa Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Webb 76 a workman sustained back injuries in 1956, and again
injured his back in 1958, both injuries occurring with the same employer.
However, insurance coverage had changed and there were different in-
surance carriers on each accident. The insurance carrier covering the last
accident furnished the injured workman with medical benefits for the last
accident, as well as for the effects of the earlier 1956 accident. The carrier
on the first accident raised the statute of limitations as a defense to any
further claim for medical benefits. In denying the defense, it was held that
the benefits furnished the injured workman by the second carrier were
considered to be furnished by the employer, thereby tolling the running
of the statute of limitations.
IX. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
The deputy commissioner 77 has been held to his statutory duty to
make sufficient findings of fact on all evidence presented and his failure
to do so requires a remand to him for the entry of a new order containing
adequate findings of fact.7" The deputy's obligation to make adequate
findings of fact is identical in modification proceedings and in original
proceedings.79 In the instances where the deputy made insufficient find-
ings, based on a wrong conclusion of law, the cause will be remanded to
him for further consideration. 0 Remands will not be permitted, despite
the deputy's failure to make adequate findings of fact, where a review of
the record reveals no evidence which would support those findings neces-
sary upon which the award would be based.8' Where such evidence exists,
74. 160 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1964).
75. 167 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1964).
76. 174 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1965).
77. The 1965 Legislature increased the salary from $13,000 to $15,000 per year.
78. Lee v. E. T. Usher Pulpwood Co., 174 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1965); O'Brien Associates v.
Smith, 159 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1963); Freeman v. Acme Roof Decks, Inc., 173 So.2d 685 (Fla.
1965).
79. Wenshaw v. Smith, 151 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1963).
80. Sauder v. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc., 156 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1963).
81. Cameron v. City of Miami Beach, 152 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1963); (record devoid of
evidence to excuse or waive notice) ; Friendly Frost Used Appliances v. Reiser, 152 So.2d 721
(Fla. 1963) (deputy's order treated as if it had sufficient findings and after which the court
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or where the deputy commissioner failed to reconcile conflict in the evi-
dence, or where his findings of fact are unclear, the cause will be re-
manded to him.82
Orders of deputy commissioners which contain sufficient findings of
fact and which are supported by competent substantial evidence have
been consistently affirmed when subjected to judicial review. Reversals by
the full commission, with or without remand, have in turn been reversed
by the supreme court where the deputy's findings were, in fact, suffi-
cient.8" Where the deputy commissioner makes findings of fact which are
supported by competent substantial evidence, these findings must be
affirmed on review:84 the parties being unable to question the lack of
evidence to support a finding when it was stipulated that the deputy may
reach his finding without necessity of evidence."s The tendency of deputy
commissioners to render ultimate judgments which would require remand
of the cause to them, rather than making adequate findings of fact as
conclusions of law, was noted by the supreme court in the case of Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Durrance.6 The court again observed that the deputy's
failure to comply with his responsibility means months and possibly years
of delay in the ultimate decision in compensation cases where prompt
action is so essential.
Awards for wage earning capacity loss where evidence demonstrated
only functional disability,"' hand disability where the evidence disclosed
only thumb disability, and unsupported findings that an injured workman
was an employee,"" have all been stricken upon review. The deputy com-
missioner's ultimate conclusion must also conform to his findings and to
the evidence. Unrealistic awards have been held to be equally erroneous.8 9
went on to review record and find no competent substantial evidence to support such finding);
City of Miami Beach v. Miller, 167 So.2d 229 (Fla. 1964) (deputy failed to find causal rela-
tionship but review of record disclosed no evidence upon which such finding could be based.).
82. Lee v. E.T. Usher Pulpwood Co., supra note 78; Pryor v. Suncoast Medical Clinic,
165 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1964).
83. Bell v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 152 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1963); deputy already
found facts for which his order was reversed and remanded by the full commission; Won v.
Won's Chinese Restaurant, 174 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1965); deputy in fact apportioned and his
finding in this regard not insufficient.
84. Pryor v. Suncoast Medical Clinic, supra note 74; Howard v. O'Neil, 166 So.2d 793
(Fla. 1964); Yates v. Gabrio Elec. Co., 167 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1964); Martini v. Kapok Tree
Inn, 172 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1964).
85. Food Fair Stores Inc., v. Brown, 159 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1964); Waymire v. Florida
Industrial Comm'n, 174 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1965).
86. 174 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1965).
87. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hayes, 172 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1965).
88. Pain extending from thumb into hand not a disabling type, Little River Bank &
Trust Co. v. Neal, 154 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1963) ; initial acceptance of claimant as an employee
of no evidentiary value, Azarian v. Azarian, 166 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1964).
89. Millender v. City of Carabelle, 174 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1965). See also Drew v. Wellman-
Lord Eng'r, Inc., 166 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1964), wherein the deputy merely adopted a medical
rating which was alleged to have been accepted by the employer-carrier, the court held that
the deputy failed to make an individual determination as to the degree of claimant's perma-
nent disability.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Deputy commissioners have the authority to make determinations on
issues as they ariseY° They may make reasonable deductions from the
evidence,9" and may give greater weight to physical evidence and lay
testimony than to scientific opinions of experts."2
On two separate occasions it was again held that the deputy com-
missioner does not have the power to pierce the corporate veil in those
instances where it is necessary to determine who is responsible for com-
pensation benefits to a disabled workman. 3 Orders entered by deputy
commissioners which are not appealed become part of the law of the
case. 4 Once an appeal has been taken, the deputy commissioner may no
longer entertain proceedings on the trial level, the appeal having divested
him of his trial powersY5 Should there be a remand to the deputy com-
missioner, the deputy has the discretion to receive additional evidence for
further trial proceedings, unless the remanding order restricts his func-
tions to certain purposes."6
In 1963 and 1964 three cases have been brought to the district courts
for enforcement of awards of the deputy commissioners. In Phoenix
Assur. Co. v. Merritt,97 the insurance carrier had complied with an award
of compensation benefits for eight months, after which it stopped payment
claiming that the disabling condition was not related to the accident. The
second district ordered reinstatement of temporary total disability, and
held that it had no jurisdiction to revoke, amend or set aside the work-
men's compensation order which was still in force and effect. In Century
Brick Corp. of Am. v. Gatewood, s a jail sentence of sixty days for con-
tempt in failing to pay a compensation award was reversed as an im-
prisonment for non-payment of debt.
X. THE FULL COMMISSION
The full Florida Industrial Commission, commonly termed the "full
commission," is the initial reviewing body where appeals are taken from
the order of deputy commissioners.99 The 1965 legislature amended sec-
tion 440.20(6) Florida Statutes, 1963, so as to allow an employer and
carrier twenty days to comply with an award before penalties are as-
90. Bryant v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 156 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1963).
91. Hughes v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 155 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1962).
92. Jeffers v. Pan Am. Envelope Co., 172 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1965).
93. Roberts Fish Farm v. Spencer, 153 So.2d 718 (Fla. 1963) ; Goldstein v. Gray Decora-
tors, Inc., 166 So.2d 438 (Fla. 1964).
94. Hodges v. State Rd. Dep't, 171 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1965).
95. Allure Shoe Corp. v. Lymberis, 173 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1965).
96. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Crosby, 168 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1964).
97. 160 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964). Assertion that enforcement proceedings were not
available for medical benefits, attorneys' fees and that administrative remedies must be first
exhausted denied in Martinque Hotel, Inc. v. Kasner, 153 So.2d 68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
98. 157 So.2d 95 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
99. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(4) (1963).
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sessed. Previously, the employer and carrier were subject to penalties if
the award was not paid within fourteen days, although under section
440.25(4)(a) Florida Statutes, 1963; the award was not final until
twenty days transpired, during which time either of the parties could
appeal to the full commission. In the 1965 legislative change, the sections
were further modified and the assessment of penalties was eliminated
where review is taken to the full commission. Previously, only appeals
to the supreme court would relieve the employer and carrier of penal-
ties.10 In its review, the full commission reviews the transcript of pro-
ceedings, and where it is impossible to have the transcript of proceedings
transcribed, the cause must be remanded for a trial de novo.'0' Where all
three members of the full commission are not present, the remaining mem-
bers may nevertheless review the cause if there is no objection made at
the time the review takes place. However, the commission is not free to
determine questions which are not properly raised on appeal."0 2 On
review, the full commission can only determine whether the deputy's
order is supported by competent substantial evidence and meets the essen-
tial requirements of law. The full commission has no jurisdiction to re-
evaluate the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the
deputy. 103
XI. REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT
Orders of the full commission entered pursuant to section 440.25
Florida Statutes, 1963, are reviewable only by petition for writ of certio-
rari to the supreme court. 0 4 The supreme court will not review issues
which are not raised in the application for review before the full com-
mission. Nor will the court review grounds not raised concisely and par-
ticularly in the application for review to the full commission.0 5 The court
has also granted motions to dismiss petitions for writ of certiorari which
present only abstract questions of law,0 6 and has declined, on its own
motion, to review orders of the full commission which are not final.' °' In
Berrien v. United States Phosphoric Prods.,10 the court dispensed with
100. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(6) (1963) excepted awards from the operation of the 20 percent
penalty only if review was had pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 440.27 (1963), this being the section
dealing with judicial review by the supreme court. This section was amended by deleting FLA.
STAT. § 440.27 (1963), and substituting therefore FLA. STAT. § 440.25 (1963), the section per-
mitting review by the full commission.
101. Lieber v. Morris Lieber, Inc., 168 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1964).
102. Davis v. Waves Motel, 169 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1964); Wesley's, Inc. v. Caramello, 156
So.2d 853 (Fla. 1963).
103. Scott v. Kerr, 156 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1963).
104. FLA. STAT. § 440.27(1) (1963).
105. Davis v. Florida Linen Serv., 170 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1964) ; Westinghouse Elec. Supply
Co. v. Reagan, 159 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1964); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Hayes, 172 So.2d 581
(Fla. 1965).
106. Brown v. Cott Bottling Co., 152 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1963).
107. Liquori v. Heftier Constr. Co., 160 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1964).
108. 157 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1963).
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oral argument pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 3.10 and denied certio-
rari. Since adopting this procedure, the court has denied oral argument
and denied certiorari in 114 cases during the period surveyed.
XII. MODIFICATION
The handling of modification proceedings before the deputy com-
missioner is no different than in any other type of proceeding before the
deputy, it being the deputy's obligation to make express findings of fact
on the issues presented. 09 It is not necessary, in modification proceedings,
for the modification award to be supported by medical testimony; 1" 0 in
those instances where the prior order required the furnishing of medical
care, a modification proceeding itself is not necessary in order to obtain
previously ordered medical benefits."' Orders which deny all benefits
other than those stipulated to are subject to modification." 2 However, the
statutory basis of "mistake of fact" was almost ruled out of existence in
the case of Steel v. A.D.H. Bldg. Contractors, Inc.:"3
One entering a stipulation relative to present facts should be
sure of his grounds before he executes the agreement and sub-
sequently reaps benefits from it. If he is unsure, he should con-
sult counsel at his elbow or should simply decline and rely on
the determination of the deputy and the full commission. Such
an agreement should neither be ignored nor set aside in the
absence of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation or withholding
facts by the adversary or some such element as would render the
agreement void." 4
In an earlier decision of Souder v. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc.,"' it
was held that a mistake of fact is one made by the deputy. In order to
show a mistake of fact, the claimant must demonstrate an erroneous
factual finding or conclusion drawn by the deputy from the evidence. The
mistake must be the factual error of the deputy and not of the witnesses.
In Steel the worthlessness of cumulative evidence was again stressed. In
Dixon v. Bruce Constr. Co.,"' the court stated that petitions for modifi-
cation, founded on mistakes of fact, would form a temptation to review,
re-try or revise what has happened and gone on before, whereas petitions
for modification based on a change of conditions would, by the term itself,
indicate occurrences or developments which were not foreseen and prob-
ably could not have been anticipated when the injury was first appraised
109. Wenshaw v. Smith, 151 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1963) ; O'Brien Ass'n v. Smith, 159 So.2d 228
(Fla. 1963).
110. Jeffers v. Pan Am. Envelope Co., 172 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1965).
111. Bryant v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 156 So.2d 844 (Fla. 1963).
112. The Fruit Bowl, Inc. v. Cheathem, 155 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1963).
113. 174 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1965).
114. Supra note 113, at 19.
115. 156 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1963).
116. 160 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1963).
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and compensation fixed. However, in Felix v. Lawnlite Co., 7 the deputy
anticipated a reduction in claimant's disability with adequate persever-
ance, and he determined her disability accordingly. When the reduction of
disability failed to materialize, modification proceedings were brought.
The deputy commissioner re-appraised the disability and awarded further
benefits, but his award was reversed on review. Subsequent surgery has
been held to constitute a change of condition."' In Food Fair Stores, Inc.
v. Tokayer,"9 it was pointed out that the statute of limitations in modifi-
cation proceedings runs separately on the compensation or money bene-
fits as opposed to the medical benefits.
XIII. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Attorneys' fees have been allowed on the trial level where the parties
have agreed to all issues, the court holding that a concession of some
responsibility is not a concession by the employer and carrier that they
were obligated for the particular disability ultimately agreed upon.120 In
Pollard v. State Rd. Dep't,'2 ' attorney's fees in the amount of 350 dollars
were awarded as a result of an order finding claimant still temporarily
and totally disabled. Eventually it was determined that the claimant sus-
tained total loss of one eye after which claimant's attorney petitioned for
an allowance of additional fees. The employer took the position that the
permanent disability for loss of the eye was voluntarily paid, and that the
attorney was not entitled to fees based on this portion of the ultimate
recovery. The employer's position was affirmed by the court by a split
decision. Subsequently, in Boyd v. Southeastern Util. Serv. Co.,'22 the
Pollard case was distinguished, the court emphasizing the fact that com-
pensation benefits there were initially controverted.
In Miami Originals, Inc. v. Ruiz,'2 3 the award of benefits upon which
the attorney's fee was based was, in part, reversed on appeal. In remand-
ing the cause to the deputy, the court stated that the attorney's fee itself
must be recomputed in view of the diminished benefits obtained. Where
the deputy commissioner sets the attorney's fee, based on stipulations of
the parties that he may do so without evidentiary basis, the parties cannot
subsequently complain of this lack of evidence.' 24
117. 174 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1965).
118. Howard v. O'Neil, 166 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1964); for another case a modification was
affirmed see Allure Shoe Corp. v. Lymberis, 173 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1965).
119. 167 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1964).
120. Thompson v. W.T. Edwards Tuberculosis Hosp., 164 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1964).
121. 151 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1963).
122. 172 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1965); here a $350.00 fee was initially awarded and subse-
quently, the claimant's rights were "washed out" against the recommendations of claimant's
attorney. In order to obtain the wash-out, claimant discharged his attorney and settled the
case directly with the carrier. Claimant's attorney held to be entitled to a fee on all benefits
including the wash-out settlement.
123. 171 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1965).
124. Food Fair Stores Inc., v. Brown, 159 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1964).
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In enforcement proceedings, the circuit court has no jurisdiction to
award additional attorneys' fees for services rendered in obtaining en-
forcement of the award.125 On the appellate level, claimants' attorneys are
entitled to attorneys' fees in defending awards even though the claimant's
rights are not directly contested, but rather where the principal issue in-
volves the responsibility of individual insurance companies. 2 ' Reason-
ableness of attorneys' fees on the appellate level is not subject to appor-
tionment.127 In Adjustable Joist Sys. v. Walker, 28 the court denied a
motion for attorneys' fees because of the failure to comply with the rele-
vant Florida Appellate Rules.
XIV. NOTICE
In Overholzer Constr. Co. v. Porter,29 the employee advised his
employer that he was suffering from back pain, but failed to notify the
employer that it was caused by an accident. In dismissing the claim for
lack of notice the court pointed out that section 440.18 Florida Statutes,
1963 (notice section) was enacted to enable an employer to make a
prompt investigation of an accident and ensuing injury so that early
medical attention may be provided if the investigation proves the accident
compensable. In Drew v. Welman-Lord Eng'r, Inc.,180 the court reversed
a deputy's finding of lack of notice where the evidence demonstrated that
the claimant notified his general foreman of the accident, and also re-
ported the accident to his immediate foreman. The court held that claim-
ant's notice of the accident to his general and immediate foremen was
sufficient notice to the employer.
XV. WAIVER
With the case of Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Reagan,"8' the
concept of waiver was brought into the Workmen's Compensation Act. In
that case a stipulation had been entered into which discharged both the
employer and carrier's obligation to pay compensation benefits, but specif-
ically made clear that liability for future medical benefits would remain
open. Claimant's attempt to subsequently set aside the stipulation was
denied, the court stating:
Under § 440.05, Fla. Statutes, an employee may waive all of the
benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We see no logical
125. A.D.H. Building Contractors v. Steele, 171 So.2d 184 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
126. Schill v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 173 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1965).
127. Overholser Constr. Co. v. Porter, 173 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1964).
128. 151 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1963).
129. Supra note 118; Accord, Cameron v. City of Miami Beach, 152 So.2d 163 (Fla.
1963).
130. 166 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1964). The deputy's finding relative to the claimant's complaints
were also found to have been unduly influenced by his erroneous finding relative to notice.
131. 159 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1964).
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reason why an employee may not waive specific provisions of
the Act.1
8 2
In subsequent decisions, the court held that Rule 3 of the Rules of
Procedure adopted by the Florida Industrial Commission was mandatory
but could be waived,18 3 that employees excluded by the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act may be brought under the Act by waiver, 8 4 and that an
employer and carrier had waived the right to contest payment of a medi-
cal billing for an unauthorized physician who failed to file medical reports
by virtue of payment of the physician's billing., However, in Hodges v.
State Road Dep't,86 the payment of compensation was held not to con-
stitute a waiver of the statute of limitations, rather it was held to be a
mere gratuity.
XVI. PENALTIES
Where reasonable cause can be shown, penalties will not be assessed
against an employer and carrier.18 7 However, if no justifiable excuse can
be presented for the failure to pay compensation, penalties will be as-
sessed.8 s The assessment of penalties may be made by the deputy or by
the circuit court in enforcement proceedings. 39
XVII. PROCEDURE
Some statutory change was accomplished by the 1965 session of the
legislature regarding procedure. Claims must now be filed with the office
of the Florida Industrial Commission in Tallahassee rather than with the
local offices of deputy commissioners. Should a claim be filed with the
deputy, the statute now requires that he immediately mail said claim to
the Florida Industrial Commission in Tallahassee, and that his failure to
do so shall in no way prejudice the rights of employees under the Work-
men's Compensation Law. 40 Section 440.25 was also amended to describe
the particular commission's office in Tallahassee as the place of filing
claims. 4' This section previously required ten days' notice to all inter-
ested parties of a hearing, said notice to be served by registered mail. The
132. Supra note 131 at 225.
133. Black v. Blue Ribbon Laundry, 161 So.2d 532 (Fla. 1964).
134. Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc., 170 So.2d 445 (Fla. 1965).
135. Mobley v. Jack & Son Plumbing, 170 So.2d 41 (Fla. 1964).
136. 171 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1965).
137. Miami Originals, Inc., v. Ruiz, 171 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1965); Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Hayes, 172 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1965).
138. Allure Shoe Corp. v. Lymberis, 173 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1965).
139. Supra note 125.
140. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.19(c),(d),(e) (1963); (No provision was made to toll the running
of the Statute of Limitations where the claim is filed with the deputy, the amendments re-
quiring the claim to be filed with the Industrial Commission's office in Tallahassee.) see FLA.
STAT. §§ 440.19(a),(b) (1963).
141. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(1) (1963).
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section was amended to increase the notice period to fifteen days and to
permit service by certified as well as registered mail.'42
Additional legislative changes were made concerning controversies
where two or more insurance carriers are obligated to pay benefits under
the Workmen's Compensation Act; the amendments limit the reimburse-
ment provision where it can be shown that the carrier, from which reim-
bursement is sought, has been prejudiced by lack of knowledge or notice
of its potential liability. In this event, reimbursement can only be had
with respect to payments made after the carrier had knowledge or notice
of its potential liability.4'4
Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure, which relates to the time for
presenting claims before deputy commissioners, has been held to be
mandatory, but subject to waiver by the parties. 44 This Rule applies to
original proceedings before the deputy commissioner as well as to modifi-
cation proceedings. 145
The Industrial Commission has adopted a new Rule, Rule 22, rela-
tive to mortality tables. The Rule utilizes the United States life tables in
determining present value of future payments of compensation.
XVIII. THIRD PARTIES AND SUBROGATION
Attempts to classify some contractors as fellow employees, and
attempts to get the sub-contractor through the negligence of the sub-con-
tractor's employee, have been denied because of the exclusive remedy
doctrine of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In May v. J.M. Mont-
gomery Roofing Co.,146 the claimant was limited to compensation where
his injuries were sustained as a result of a sub-contractor's employee's
negligence, the sub-contractor being protected by the exclusive remedy
doctrine. Subsequently, in Edwards v. 0. L. Richey, 47 the claimant, an
employee of the general contractor, was injured by a scaffold plank be-
longing to a sub-contractor. The claimant brought a third party suit
against the sub-contractor and alleged that the suit could be maintained
because the sub-contractor was being sued in his capacity as a fellow
employee. Under the facts of the case, it was held that the sub-contractor
could not be classified as a fellow employee.
The amount of subrogated interest which a carrier has in a third
party law suit has been held to be discretionary. A trial court's allowance
142. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3) (a) (1963).
143. FLA. STAT. § 440.42(3) (1963).
144. Supra note 133.
145. B.F. Todd Elec. Contractors v. Hammond, 164 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1964).
146. 158 So.2d 147 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
147. 173 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); the exclusive remedy doctrine held to be a
matter of defense and not properly the subject of a motion to dismiss in Preston v. Grant
Advertising, Inc., 166 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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of nothing was affirmed in United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Harb.4 8
The subrogated interest of the workmen's carrier extends to all compen-
sation which is paid, without regard to whether it is paid to a widow or
for the benefit of minor children.14 It includes medical expenses, but not
funeral bills.150
XIX. ADDITIONAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST
In Carraway v. Armour & Co.,' a paraduodenal hernia was held
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but not under the
hernia section. It was there decided that only inguinal, femoral, and
those similar to these specified hernias, come under the hernia section.
An attempt to set aside a joint petition, which disposed of claimant's
rights, was denied in State v. Florida Industrial Comm'n,'52 it being held
that joint petitions need not be verified.
In 1963, an opinion construed the 1953 provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act relative to permanent total disability. In Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. v. Hinson,"5 8 the claimant was found to be permanently and
totally disabled which, under the law as it existed at the time, provided
for a maximum payment of 700 weeks compensation. The claimant had
already been paid 350 weeks compensation for temporary total disability.
The deputy commissioner denied credit for the 350 weeks. In reversing
the deputy, the court directed credit to be granted and noted that the
disability had been permanent from its inception.
XX. CONCLUSION
The most significant developments in the period surveyed are those
governing the Rules of the Florida Industrial Commission and the
obligations of the medical practitioners and medical institutions to file
medical reports. Technicality has become more prevalent with adminis-
trative sclerosis'54 and protracted appeals delaying finality and payment of
awards. During the period surveyed the Florida Supreme Court adopted a
new procedure of denying judicial review without granting oral argument,
and without opinion, in approximately one-half of the cases filed in the
court.
The statistical information furnished by the Florida Industrial
148. 170 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); See also Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Grice, 172
So.2d 834 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965), for an allowance of 35 percent of compensation paid.
149. Pursell v. Sumter Elec. Co-op., Inc., 169 So.2d 515 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
150. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. McNair, 152 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
151. 156 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1963).
152. 151 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1963).
153. 155 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1963).
154. A term used by senior Deputy Commissioner Samuel Halpert at the October 1965
meeting of the Florida Bar Committee on workmen's compensation.
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Commission indicates the total injuries reported to the commission in
the year 1963, was 203,407. The reported injuries increased in 1964, to
222,485. In the year 1963, deputy commissioners entered orders on
7,677 claims and in 1964, the total orders entered amounted to 8,911 or
an increase of 1,234 orders. However, of the orders entered in 1963,
48.4 percent were "wash-out" orders approving joint petitions not sub-
ject to modification, the total of these orders being 3,715. In 1964, 55.9
percent of the total orders entered were "wash-out" orders approving
joint petitions not subject to modification, the total of these orders being
4,983. Consequently, the total increase in orders from 1963 to 1964, can
be attributed directly to the alarming increase in the number of cases
disposed of under the "wash-out" or joint petition procedure, the numer-
ical increase amounting to 1,268 in the year 1964.116
155. In'duded in "orders entered" are those orders which extended time for taking testi-
mony of which there were 149 in 1964 and miscellaneous orders of unknown character of
which there were 795 in 1964. If these orders were excluded and adjudications only were
considered, the wash-out orders would account for 62.5 percent of the total adjudications of
claims before deputy's in 1964.
